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1 Recent Economic Developments  
 GDP and Industrial Production, Investment, The Balance of Payments,
 Capital Flows, FDI, Inflation and Stabilization Policy, Impact of Food 
 Inflation, Fiscal Policy, Federal Budget, Income, Employment, Debt, 
 Financial Sector, Structural Reforms.
2 Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability of the Russian  
 Federation
3 Tackling Health Reform
Russia’s decade-long economic expansion accelerated in 2007–08—despite 
worsening global conditions. But with the economy likely overheating, the 
new government has to adjust its macroeconomic policy mix to reduce infla-
tion. And to ensure sustainable economic growth, it has to tackle the remaining 
structural reforms.
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1Recent EconomicDevelopments1Russia’s short-term growth has accelerated 
above trends, with signs of overheating. Rus-
sia’s real GDP growth accelerated to 7.4 percent 
in 2006 and 8.1 percent in 2007––well above 
the long-term trend of 7 percent (box 1.1). And 
early data for 2008 show growth above 8 per-
cent (table 1.1). Compare that with estimates 
putting long-term growth potential at about 
6 percent (IMF 2006). Suggesting that the 
economy is straining its productive capacity, 
capacity use is up from 69 percent in 2001 to 81 
percent in March 2008, with two of five firms 
surveyed reporting more than 90 percent. And 
unemployment is at its lowest since 1994 (6.1 
percent at the end of 2007).
1 Prepared by a World Bank team led by Zeljko Bogetic, Lead Economist for Russia and PREM Country Sector 
Coordinator. The team members were: Sergey Ulatov (Economist), Olga Emelyanova (Research Consultant), and 
Karlis Smits (Economist).
“Russia in the next four years should focus on four I’s: institutions, infrastructure, 
innovations, investment”
President Dmitry Medvedev
East Siberian Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum, 15 February 2008
An overheating economy—amid weaker 
global conditions
After eight years of declining inflation, con-
sumer price inflation rose in 2007. Consum-
er price index (CPI) inflation accelerated to 
11.9 percent at end-2007, exceeding the initial 
government target of no more than 8 percent. 
Driving this inflation are excess liquidity, fis-
cal relaxation, and food price inflation. The 
excess—high liquidity from unsterilized capital 
inflows, partly unsterilized oil revenues, nega-
tive real interest rates, and a tightly managed 
exchange rate—fed a boom in credit and do-
mestic demand. Part of the 2007 inflation was 
related to higher prices for imported food, but 
monetary and fiscal factors were more impor-
tant, adding to inflationary expectations re-
flected in demands for higher wages.
Russia’s short-term economic growth has run above its long-term trend, despite weak global con-
ditions. In 2007, the economy grew by 8.1 percent on the heels of high oil prices, robust domestic 
demand, and strong macroeconomic fundamentals. Preliminary data show even faster real growth 
in GDP, at 8.5 percent, for the first quarter of 2008 and industrial production of 6.2 percent. But in-
flation is rising, productive capacity is strained, infrastructure constraints are tightening, and real 
wage increases are greater than productivity gains. All this suggests that the economy is overheat-
ing—that aggregate demand is outpacing Russia’s long-term productive capacity. The new govern-
ment’s key policy challenges are reducing inflation and tackling the remaining structural reforms.
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Box 1:  Signs of overheating
An economy overheats when its 
productive capacity cannot keep 
pace with aggregate demand. This 
typically happens when economic 
growth is above its long-term po-
tential, opening a gap between ac-
tual and potential output. Although 
data constraints make it difficult 
to estimate the output gap for an 
economy undergoing structural 
transformation, there are six signs 
of overheating: 
• Double-digit or accelerating in-
flation, seemingly unresponsive 
to monetary policy. 
• High use of factors of produc-
tion (capital and labor). 
• Nominal wage growth signifi-
cantly outpacing inflation. 
• Real wage growth higher than 
productivity growth. 
• Infrastructure constraints reflected in tighter electricity balance or shortages, transport congestion, and ad-
ditional infrastructure costs to maintain steady service supply.
• Rapid growth in real estate prices (higher than general inflation).
• Rapid growth of imports and deterioration in the external current account. 
All these signs are present in Russia today. The current account surplus from high oil prices masks the rapid growth 
of imports and the deepening of the nonoil current account deficit.
The difficult global environment offers both 
opportunities and risks to Russia’s economic 
expansion. The run-up in oil prices has brought 
windfalls, but it has also increased Russia’s de-
pendence on oil exports and revenues. If oil prices 
soften as new supplies come on stream and global 
demand declines further, a rapid weakening of oil 
and fiscal revenues would complicate macroeco-
nomic management (figures 1.1 and 1.2).
GDP and industrial production— 
shifting to nontradables 
Real GDP growth has shifted toward non-
tradables, reflecting booming domestic de-
mand and an appreciating ruble. There is a 
clear shift away from resource extraction and 
toward trade and construction. In 2003–04, 
oil and some industrial sectors drove economic 
growth, but the subsequent expansion was 
driven largely by nontradable goods and ser-
vices for the domestic market, including manu-
facturing goods. In 2007, wholesale and retail 
trade alone accounted for almost a third of 
economic growth. Booming construction and 
manufacturing contributed another 30 per-
cent. Manufacturing expanded by 7.4 percent 
in 2007, up from 2.9 percent in 2006. By con-
trast, growth in resource extraction virtually 
stopped, reflecting capacity constraints (table 
1.2). The good news, so far, is that high rates 
of productivity growth underlie this robust 
growth.
Changes in output by sector indicate simi-
lar trends, with construction and retail 
trade growing particularly fast. Construc-
tion grew at 14.5 percent a year in 2003–07, 
and retail trade at 13.0 percent, outpacing the 
rest of the economy. Reflecting tighter capac-
ity constraints, industrial expansion is now 
driven much less by extraction industries, but 
almost entirely by manufacturing. Early data 
for 2008 suggest continued, strong growth in 
industry: 6.9 percent.
Detailed manufacturing data for the first 
four months of 2008 continue to show robust 
growth across a range of manufacturing 
subsectors (figures 1.3–1.6). Rubber and plastics 
products—growing by more than 30 percent, up 
from 13 percent a year before—fed the boom 
in domestic construction and durable goods 
(figure 1.4). Machines and equipment continued 
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to expand by more than 
20 percent. But several 
industries reported lower 
growth, especially electro-
technical equipment, food, 
and chemicals (figures 1.3–
1.5). Rising labor costs and 
appreciating currency are 
likely behind the gradual 
slowing of these sectors.
Investment—propelling 
short-term growth 
but…
Booming domestic demand, 
particularly investment, 
propelled short-term 
growth, but overall 
investment remains moderate. Investment 
demand, rising by more than 20 percent, drove 
economic growth in the first four months of 
2008. Even so, investment remains lower in 
Russia as a share of GDP (21 percent) than in 
other emerging market economies that have 
sustained high growth. Republic of Korea (38 
percent), China (42 percent), and India (34 
percent) all maintained significantly higher rates 
of investment over long periods (1980–2007). 
Budgetary investments have remained modest 
for infrastructure rehabilitation and investment, 
but nonbudgetary investments, including those 
by state corporations, have grown (table 1.4).
Russia’s investments remain concentrated in 
a few sectors, reflecting the economy’s limited 
diversification. This parallels the growth of 
nontradables noted above. The bulk of investment 
is in resource industries and in transportation 
and communication services (table 1.5). As a 
result, resource industries increased their share 
in total investment to 17.3 percent in 2007 (from 
15.2 percent in 2005), while manufacturing 
industries reduced their 
share to 15.7 percent in 
2007 (from 17.6 percent 
in 2005). So, Russia does 
not appear to be investing 
in industries that could 
diversify its economic 
structure. Why? Because 
of the difficulties of 
diversifying from oil and 
gas and the uncertainties 
in the business and 
investment climates. 
High oil and gas prices and profits—and the 
appreciating ruble—have brought record for-
eign direct investment inflows, mainly to the 
extractive industries. Russia recorded foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows of USD 27.8 
billion in 2007 (Rosstat definition, excluding 
profits), up from USD 6.8 billion in 2003 (table 
1.6). Per capita FDI rose almost sevenfold to 
USD 369, far higher than in other BRIC coun-
tries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) but lower 
than the average in developed market econo-
mies. In 2007 extractive industries received 
about 50 percent of FDI inflows, while man-
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ufacturing––the current engine of growth–
–received only 15 percent (table 1.7), and in 
the first quarter of 2008 only USD 5.6 billion, 
half the amount in the first quarter of 2007. 
The structure of FDI has also changed, with 
electricity, gas, and water suddenly receiving a 
third of the inflow (USD 1.9 billion), reflecting 
new investments in TGK (teretorialnaya gen-
eriruushaya kompania) and OGKs (optovaya 
generiruushaya kompania)  electricity generat-
ing companies.  Meanwhile, the share of FDI in 
manufacturing declined to 13.1 percent.
Inflation pressures and food prices—
accelerating
Inflation momentum has accelerated, reflect-
ing money supply growth and food price in-
flation. Money supply (M2) growth slowed 
significantly in recent months, but the excess 
liquidity from past capital inflows, domestic 
monetary expansion, and the fiscal stimulus at 
the end of 2007 continues to pressure prices, 
independent of food prices (table 1.8). As a re-
sult, year-on-year inflation doubled to 14.3 per-
cent in April, up from 7.4 percent a year before. 
Core price inflation has also grown, reflecting 
broad liquidity pressures, again independent of 
food price inflation (figure 1.8). Administrative 
measures to control food inflation, introduced 
in October 2007 and lifted at end-April 2008, 
proved ineffective. Indeed, food inflation–
–including that for the six socially sensitive 
food items––accelerated in early 2008, with 
12-month inflation on all food products at 21 
percent in March, up sharply from 4 percent a 
year before (figure 1.9).  
Monetary and exchange rate policy—loose
The Central Bank of Russia has resisted ru-
ble appreciation with heavy monetary inter-
ventions, pushing considerable liquidity into 
the system. But this has encouraged capital in-
flows, foreign borrowing, and high inflation, re-
sulting in the real appreciation of the ruble and 
pressure on nontradable goods and services. 
Changes in net foreign assets remain the larg-
est source of money growth. Combined with 
the more relaxed fiscal policy, the macro policy 
mix is excessively expansionary as the economy 
overheats.   
This policy mix risks further increases in infla-
tion and a real appreciation of the ruble, which 
will eventually undermine growth. The macro 
policy mix has to be adjusted to reduce infla-
tion by increasing interest rates, raising reserve 
requirement, and implementing a more flexible 
exchange rate policy and a tighter fiscal policy. 
These adjustments would help cool the economy, 
producing a more sustainable growth path. 
Since February 2008 the central bank has 
very gradually adjusted the direction of 
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monetary policy, but with the 
balance of risks shifting to in-
flation, further tightening is 
needed. The central bank raised 
the refinancing rate at the begin-
ning of the year from 10 percent 
to 10.5 percent and, on May 26, 
raised reserve requirements on 
liabilities to nonresident banks 
from 5.5 percent to 7 percent. 
The reserve requirements on lia-
bilities to households in national 
currency have also been raised 
from 4.5 percent to 5 percent, 
and those on other liabilities 
from 5 percent to 5.5 percent. 
More tightening will be required 
to reduce inflation. This could 
result in further appreciation of 
the ruble, but in today’s interna-
tional environment of reduced 
capital inflows this risk appears 
lower than that of accelerating 
inflation. 
Despite liquidity pressures, 
food inflation contributed more 
to CPI inflation in the first four 
months of 2008 than in the pre-
vious year, complicating mac-
roeconomic management and 
compromising poverty reduc-
tion. Food inflation has also hurt 
the incomes of the poor, especial-
ly in the poorer regions (box 1.2). 
The seasonal increase in adminis-
tered prices for housing and utili-
ties remained almost unchanged, 
at about 1.2 percentage points in 
January–April 2008, compared 
with 1.1 percentage points in the 
same period of 2007 (figure 1.9). But the pric-
es of fruits and vegetables, bread and bakery 
products, and meat, milk, and milk products—
with significant import content—contributed 
to higher inflation (table 1.9). Even so, the in-
crease in the CPI across all categories of goods 
reflects broader monetary and fiscal factors.
Income and employment—rising  
incomes, tighter labor markets
Robust economic growth has come with dou-
ble-digit increases in real incomes and wag-
es, a trend that continues in 2008. According 
to Rosstat, average real wages increased by 
13.1 percent, and real disposable incomes by 
11.8 percent in the first four months of 2008 
(figure 1.10 and table 1.10). The increases 
continue to exceed real GDP and productivity 
growth. Almost all sectors reported increases 
in real wages well above 10 percent, with those 
in the public sector, retail trade, and construc-
tion increasing by 16–17 percent. The average 
monthly dollar wage rose to USD 649.4 in the 
first four months of 2008, up about 40 percent 
from the first four months of 2007, partly re-
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flecting the nominal appreciation of the ruble 
against the dollar.
Unemployment fell in the first quarter of 
2008, signaling tighter labor markets. The av-
erage unemployment rate in the first quarter of 
2008 was an estimated 6.6 percent (by the ILO 
definition), down from 7.0 percent in the first 
quarter of 2007 (table 1.10). But unemploy-
ment varies across Russia’s regions—lowest in 
the Central Federal Okrug, at 4.1 percent, and 
the highest in the Southern Federal Okrug, at 
13.7 percent.     
Balance of payments and capital  
inflows—still robust
Record-high oil prices and robust capital 
inflows contributed to continuing strength 
in the balance of payments and a further 
buildup of reserves during 2007. Contrary to 
earlier expectations, preliminary figures for the 
first quarter of 2008 suggest a current account 
that is still strengthening. Thanks to high oil 
prices and oil-related exports, the current ac-
count is up to an estimated USD 37.0 billion, 
against USD 22.9 billion in the first quarter 
?
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of 2007 (table 1.11). According to the central 
bank, imports grew by almost 42 percent in 
the first quarter of 2008, to USD 60.7 billion, 
up from USD 31 billion in the first quarter of 
2007. And exports grew by more than 50 per-
cent, to USD 108.1 billion, from USD 71.8 bil-
lion (figure 1.11). But excluding oil and gas, 
the current account deteriorated in the past 
few years, especially with the continuing cur-
rency appreciation since the beginning of 2007 
(figure 1.12)
Russia registered record net capital inflows 
in 2007 into banking and nonbanking sectors, 
boosting liquidity. The inflows reflected strong 
fundamentals, an appreciating ruble, and low 
external vulnerability. They also maintained 
dynamic growth in the banking sector. Despite 
further growth in the Oil Reserve and National 
Welfare funds, the central bank could not fully 
sterilize the domestic monetary impact of oil 
revenues and the large inflows under a fixed ex-
change rate. So, the rapid growth in the money 
supply—44 percent in 2007—outpaced nominal 
incomes and brought inflationary pressures. 
Adding to these pressures were the rise in pub-
lic spending, global food price inflation, and 
rapidly growing domestic demand. Temporary 
administrative measures touching the socially 
sensitive food items in October–April did little 
to contain inflation. Russia’s USD 23 billion in 
net capital outflows in the first quarter of 2008 
reflected turbulence in global financial mar-
kets, but new net inflows of USD 20 billion in 
April partly reversed that trend, according to 
preliminary data from the Ministry of Finance 
(table 1.12).
Fiscal policy and the federal budget— 
a more relaxed stance 
While oil windfalls sustain high fiscal sur-
pluses, since the end of 2007 Russia’s fiscal 
stance has become more relaxed, and the 
budget more dependent on oil revenues. The 
execution data on general government spend-
ing in 2007 (federal budgets, regional and lo-
cal budgets, and the social funds) show sub-
stantially higher public spending compared 
with the two years before (table 1.13). Those 
increases were implemented largely in the 
last quarter of 2007. To finance priority infra-
structure and social programs, the government 
boosted public expenditures by about 2 percent 
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of GDP through various state corporations. 
With inflation gaining momentum, the fis-
cal stimulus added to the pressure. The 
general government surplus declined to 6.1 
percent of GDP in 2007 from more than 8 
percent in 2005–06. The data also indicate 
that budget is becoming more vulnerable to 
lower oil revenues.  
Russia continues to enjoy healthy fiscal 
surpluses, but they are falling faster than 
required for effective disinflation. Accord-
ing to preliminary estimates for the first 
quarter of 2008, the federal budget generat-
ed a surplus of 6.6 percent of GDP on a cash 
basis, down slightly from 7.3 percent in the 
first quarter. Record-high oil prices helped 
the government generate revenues of 1.932 
billion rubles (23.4 percent of GDP), ex-
ceeding the 20.7 percent target in the 2008 
Budget Law. Federal spending so far totaled 
1.383 billion rubles, or 16.7 percent of GDP 
on a cash basis, against 17.7 percent in the 2008 
Budget Law. Pressures are building to spend 
additional windfalls without enough attention 
to the impact on inflation.
The recent revisions to the federal budget 
for 2008–10 envisage further relaxation in 
the fiscal stance. In February 2008 the gov-
ernment approved an amendment to the 2008 
Budget Law to increase noninterest expendi-
tures by 310 billion rubles, along with a further 
decline in the fiscal surplus to 3.0 percent of 
GDP in 2008 and to 1.0 percent in 2009–10 
(table 1.14). The nonoil deficit is projected at 
about 6 percent of GDP in 2008–09 and 5.1 
percent in 2010, covered mostly by oil and gas 
transfers.  
By relaxing the fiscal policy stance when the 
economy is overheating, the government risks 
unwinding hard-won stabilization gains. The 
additional fiscal stimulus of 2007 likely contrib-
uted to accelerated inflation—rapidly increas-
ing the money supply in the fourth quarter of 
2007 and continuing to pressure inflation up-
ward this year. Given the ambitious programs 
to develop state corporations and to adjust and 
index public wages and pensions, the 2008 oil 
windfall will tempt the government to further 
increase spending. The likely inflationary pres-
sures will be difficult to suppress later. 
External public and corporate debt—
growing fast
External debt stock and external vulner-
ability remain within a comfortable range, 
but Russia’s private corporate and banking 
debt is growing fast (figure 1.13). A rapid 
buildup of corporate and banking debt partly 
financed the massive consumption and in-
vestment spree of recent years. With general 
government external debt modest and declin-
ing, this banking and corporate debt—public 
and private—explains almost all the buildup 
of external debt (figure 1.13, left panel). Ex-
ternal private debt almost tripled, from $106 
10 Russian Economic Report 16        JUNE 2008
billion at the end of 2005 to $275 billion at 
the end of 2007. External public debt, which 
includes the general government and public 
financial and nonfinancial organizations, has 
also grown thanks to borrowing in large state 
companies—but not nearly as fast as private 
sector debt. Although overall debt appears 
low compared with the economy’s size and its 
massive international reserves, it has become 
a concern at the central bank. That exuberant 
private borrowing, if continuing at the same 
pace during a prolonged global credit crunch, 
could undermine corporate liquidity and re-
payments, spilling over into the banking sys-
tem, which faces its own risks.
Financial sector vulnerabilities— 
credit, liquidity, and market risks  
require monitoring 2
Russian banking has enjoyed rapid growth 
and good profitability, partly on the heels of 
large capital inflows and foreign borrowing. 
Bank assets have grown at about 40 percent a 
year since 2004, rising to nearly 17 trillion ru-
bles in 2007 from about 4 trillion in 2002. Loan 
portfolios increased more rapidly, accelerating 
to nearly 12 trillion rubles in 2007 (36.5 per-
cent of GDP) from about 2.5 trillion rubles in 
2002 (23.1 percent of GDP). The rapid growth 
in bank credit spurred strong earnings. Aver-
age returns on equity in banking grew from 18 
percent in 2002 to about 26 percent in 2006, 
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and average returns on assets ballooned 
from an already high 2.6 percent in 
2002 to 3.2 percent in 2006. Both are 
well above those of most emerging mar-
ket countries. 
Russian banking has weathered global 
financial turbulence, but credit, liquid-
ity, and market risks require monitor-
ing. The credit portfolio may face strains 
from the rapid credit expansion over 
the last decade, the entry of new and 
inexperienced borrowers, and banks’ 
uncertain ability to manage the risks. 
The brisk growth in mortgage lending 
could become a concern. Mortgage loans 
increased fivefold during 2000–06 and 
by at least 70 percent in 2007, though 
the consumer segment remains small 
(13 percent). The following issues are 
worth noting.
The retail deposit base is concen-•	
trated in Sberbank, forcing large and medi-
um-size banks to rely more on international 
funding. Household deposits represent 30 
percent of bank liabilities on average, but 
they are concentrated in the state-owned 
banks, which hold more than 40 percent 
of bank assets (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprom-
bank, Bank of Moscow, and the Russian Ag-
ricultural Bank). 
The concentration of corporate deposits •	
remains a concern for smaller banks. With-
drawals by a few large customers could re-
duce liquidity. For some smaller banks, the 
20 largest depositors account for more than 
half of customer funding. 
Banks relying on external funding risk a •	
contraction in global credit. Benefiting 
from abundant global liquidity, banks oper-
ating in Russia have borrowed significantly 
from abroad over the last few years. This 
may pose refinancing risks for some banks. 
Banks’ exposure to market risk has grown •	
with deeper capital markets and banks’ 
greater sophistication. Securities portfolios, 
about 20 percent of assets at the end of 2007, 
are dominated by corporate bonds, though 
equity holdings are also significant for some 
banks. These securities expose banks to po-
tential losses from adverse movements in 
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Box 1.2: Impact of world food inflation on Russia’s poor
The impact of the world food price shock on Russia was significant. Over the past five years, and particularly in 
recent months, food prices in Russia grew much faster than nonfood prices, driving 82 percent of the CPI increase 
between July 2007 and March 2008 (box figure 1). Food prices increased the most in the Volga region, and least in 
the Far East Federal Okrug. Food inflation in western Russia 
was higher than in the eastern regions. 
The implications for poverty are troubling. The food price 
spike could raise Russia’s overall national poverty rates by 1.2 
percentage points and its vulnerability rate by 4.3 percentage 
points, all else being equal, according to preliminary World 
Bank simulations based on the international poverty line 
of USD 2.15 per day. That would potentially push 1.7 mil-
lion more people into poverty and render another 6 million 
vulnerable to poverty. The simulation excludes the interim 
increase in real incomes, particularly for households that are 
net producers of food, which may have offset the adverse 
price shock (box figure 2).
The Russian government responded with a mix of mea-
sures, as did many other countries. New export tariffs val-
id until April 2008 were introduced for wheat (10 percent) 
and barley (30 percent). Import tariffs were reduced on milk 
and milk products (15 percent to 5 percent), and on certain 
types of vegetable oils, cabbage, carrots, and beets. The main 
food suppliers and retail food chains agreed in January to 
fix the price of five key food products. These administrative 
price controls expired, however, on 1 
May 2008. 
The government also announced that 
it would use strategic grain reserves to 
smooth sharp fluctuations in domestic 
wheat prices. But many governments 
have tried to limit domestic food price 
increases through mandated grain pric-
es, export restrictions, procurement, and 
other such direct controls—with only a 
limited impact on domestic prices.
International experien ce and good 
practice suggest that for a net food ex-
porter like Russia, a preferable policy 
response to a food price shock would 
be to: 
• Allow a full pass-through of the 
price increase, to provide local produc-
ers the largest possible incentives to in-
crease food production for domestic and 
international markets and to mode rate 
domestic demand. 
• Scale up targeted social assistance to truly needy households. 
• Implement measures to boost agricultural productivity.
Source: Prepared by Salman Zaidi (Senior Economist) and Victor Sulla (Consultant), World Bank. Broader analy-
sis of poverty in Russia may be found in the World Bank’s Poverty Assessment for Russia (2008), forthcoming.
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equity or bond prices. 
The continuing global credit crunch is strain-
ing banks’ funding model. If the global credit 
crunch is prolonged, the system could face 
funding problems. With Russia’s thin domestic 
capital markets and its retail deposits concen-
trated in the largest state banks, some banks 
must depend on foreign funding. Sustained, 
restricted access to foreign borrowing could 
increase funding costs, slow credit growth, re-
duce profitability and capital, and expose banks 
to refinancing difficulties. Rapid credit growth 
has so far sustained strong earnings, but profits 
are coming under pressure. 
High interest rates on the fastest growing 
credit segment (consumer 
lending), along with low de-
posit rates, have translated 
into high spreads by interna-
tional standards. But greater 
competition in lending is com-
pressing margins. As banks re-
trench their lending to remain 
liquid, funding pressures may 
reduce profits. And raising 
capital under today’s market 
conditions could be a challenge. 
Slowing profits will constrain 
internal fund generation. The 
ongoing turmoil in interna-
tional markets may also reduce 
investor appetite for Russian 
investments, making it more 
difficult and costly for Russian 
banks to tap those markets for 
capital. For smaller banks, capi-
tal increases will likely continue 
to rely on equity injections from 
core shareholders. 
Structural reforms—much 
progress, but more needed
Russia has implemented important  
reforms in recent years, mainly fiscal
Large oil windfalls were saved in the Sta-•	
bilization Fund—not spent. That fund was 
transformed into the Reserve Fund, capped 
at 10 percent of GDP, and the National 
Welfare Fund, which accumulates oil sur-
pluses beyond the Reserve Fund, possibly 
for priority investment and social programs. 
Healthy fiscal surpluses repaid the external 
debt and reduced external vulnerabilities.
Budgetary and tax reforms brought three-•	
year budget plans and long-term fiscal plan-
ning, following good practice in New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom. Russia also 
reduced the number of taxes and the overall 
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tax burden—including cutting the flat in-
come tax to 13 percent and the VAT to 18 
percent.
The government improved tax collection and •	
customs administration, eliminated noncash 
budgetary settlements, and strengthened 
budget management and controls, including 
establishing a single treasury account.
Intergovernmental finances were reformed, •	
with the government adopting a modern 
transfer equalization formula, phasing out 
unfunded mandates, and creating more sta-
ble revenue and expenditure assignments 
among different layers of government.
The foreign exchange system and financial •	
markets were liberalized, from a low base. 
But scope for financial deepening remains.
The government began to improve judi-•	
cial efficiency and independence through 
higher salaries, publication of judicial deci-
sions, and an April 2008 instruction from 
the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration 
Court prohibiting judges from confiscating 
private property to settle tax disputes.
To regain momentum on structural reforms, 
in early 2006 the government approved the 
Medium-Term Social-Economic Program for 
2006–08. The program targeted inefficient 
government operations, weak diversification, 
limited competition, the large share of the non-
market economy, infrastructure constraints, 
the low mobility of production factors across 
regions, and inadequate incentives and op-
portunities to rapidly develop human capital. 
Efforts were also made on administrative and 
judicial reform—a formidable agenda.
Structural reforms have stalled in the past few 
years. There was some progress—for example, 
on the four national projects in health, educa-
tion, housing, and agriculture. But important 
structural challenges remain, especially for the 
business and investment climate, for small and 
medium-size enterprises, and for governance. 
Russia’s investment climate still suffers from 
uncertain public governance, especially on 
fighting corruption, protecting and enforcing 
property rights, facilitating competition, re-
moving barriers to migration, and strengthen-
15 
ing judicial independence and transparency.
Policy challenges going forward
The new Russian government has inherited 
a booming economy, but important policy 
challenges remain. The first challenge is to 
reduce inflation and strengthen macroeco-
nomic stability, the linchpin of the economic 
growth over the past nine years. The seeming 
choice between high growth or macroeconomic 
stability—as sometimes formulated in domestic 
debates—is a false dilemma. International ex-
perience overwhelmingly suggests that high, 
sustained growth cannot be achieved with 
high inflation, which hurts both saving and 
investment. So, reducing inflation is necessary 
for sustained high rates of economic growth.1 
But reducing inflation is not enough to ensure 
sustained, fast, and inclusive growth. For this, 
Russia needs to jumpstart progress on the re-
maining structural reforms, especially institu-
tional reforms and infrastructure gaps. Doing 
so will sustain rapid, long-term productivity 
growth.2 Advancing social reforms and pro-
moting regional development will ensure a 
wider distribution of growth’s benefits across 
Russia’s large population and vast territory.3
To reduce inflation, the macroeconomic poli-
cy mix needs adjustment. Fiscal and monetary 
policies have to be tightened to reduce excess 
liquidity, cool domestic demand, and moderate 
private borrowing. That could mean tighten-
ing the fiscal stance in the short term, phasing 
planned public expenditures over the longer 
term, continuing monetary tightening through 
gradual increases in interest rates and reserve 
requirements, and introducing a more flexible 
exchange rate, as announced by the central 
bank. Avoiding further recourse to adminis-
trative price controls and export restrictions 
would support these shifts, as would selecting 
and phasing planned public investments in line 
with capacity by strengthening the screening 
of investment projects and reducing nonprior-
ity public expenditures.
 
Major challenges remain: improving the busi-
ness environment and investment climate, 
reducing barriers to small and medium-size 
businesses, closing the infrastructure gaps, 
and deepening the environment for open trad-
ing. The needed changes are likely to require re-
ducing the inspection and regulatory burden on 
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small and medium-size businesses, fighting cor-
ruption, strengthening the rule of law, and reduc-
ing infrastructure gaps by enhancing efficiency. 
They will also require new public investments 
and public-private partnerships, along with 
greater competition and a deeper open trading 
environment. For many of these reforms to suc-
ceed, strengthening judicial efficiency, indepen-
dence, and transparency will be key. President 
Medvedev’s policy emphasis on the four I’s—
institutions, infrastructure, innovations, and 
investment––outlines important priorities for 
the new government to reinvigorate structural 
reforms, foster productivity gains, and form a 
base for sustained economic growth.
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2 This section was contributed by Fernando Montes-Negret (Sector Director, ECSPF), Lalith Raina (Sector Manager, ECSPF) 
and Sylvie Bossoutrot (Sr. Operations Officer, ECSPF), World Bank.
3 See the just-released report on the new consensus on economic growth by the International Growth Commission, chaired by the 
Nobel Prize–winner Michael Spance at www.growthcommission.org.
4 See the World Bank’s report Unleashing Prosperity: Productivity Growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (2008), 
World Bank, Washington D.C. (also on the Bank’s external website for Europe and Central Asia region: www.worldbank.org/
eca).
5 See the World Bank’s report Regional Development and Growth Agglomerations: The Longer-Term Challenges of Economic 
Transition in the Russian Federation (2008), A Country Economic Memorandum for Russia, World Bank, forthoming.
17 2 Long-term Fiscal Sustainability of the Russian Federation1
Russia faces major long-term fiscal risks: un-
certain, volatile oil and gas revenues and rising 
spending on pensions, health, and education. 
Unless solutions are put in place in the short to 
medium term, Russia’s strong fiscal position will 
unwind. That would imperil its ongoing economic 
expansion. 
To deal with the risks, the new government should 
take four actions: make fiscal sustainability a 
top priority, expand the tax base outside oil and 
gas to substitute when oil revenues decline, iden-
tify possible savings to create room for spend-
ing priorities, and consider a fiscal “permanent 
income” rule—keeping the nonoil primary fiscal 
deficit below what can be financed safely from 
oil revenues—to keep fiscal policy on an auto-
matically sustainable trajectory.
Over the past nine years, Russia’s fiscal 
policy was prudently conservative, but the 
future fiscal risks are significant. Russia has 
wisely chosen to reduce spending volatility by 
diverting a stable flow of oil revenues to the 
budget and allocating the rest to a stabiliza-
tion fund. This reduced the adverse impact on 
the domestic economy and its competitiveness. 
Solid fiscal management created the founda-
tion for nine years of strong economic growth. 
But fiscal prudence should not be taken for 
granted: Russia faces serious risks in the long 
term, which threaten to unwind the hard-won 
gains from reforms. This section elaborates the 
implications of three risks that threaten Rus-
sia’s fiscal position—from oil price volatility, 
from expenditure pressures linked to pensions, 
education, and health spending, and from the 
renewed debt that could ensue. It argues that 
1 Prepared by Zeljko Bogetic, Lead Economist for Russia 
and PREM Country Sector Coordinator. The note draws 
on a series of technical notes prepared by the World 
Bank for the Ministry of Finance in February 2008 and 
the paper “Oil Revenues, Expenditure Pressures, and 
Fiscal Sustainability in Russia,” with S. van Wijnbergen 
and N. Budina, presented at Higher School of Economics 
Conference in Moscow, April 1-3, 2008. This research is 
part of a larger, on-going World Bank’s project Russia: 
Long-Term Fiscal Study.
the new government should make preserving 
fiscal prudence and sustainability its key policy 
objective, proposing a fiscal rule—the perma-
nent income rule—that could ensure long-term 
fiscal sustainability automatically. 
Three fiscal challenges—uncertain  
revenues, rising expenditures, and  
the specter of renewed debt
Issue 1: Oil revenues, booming today, 
could become a drag on economic  
performance
The strong recovery of oil prices since 2000 
increased Russia’s dependence on oil and gas 
revenue, making it more vulnerable to price 
declines. The share of oil revenue in total fiscal 
revenue increased substantially—from 10 per-
cent of GDP to about 30 percent. Instead of di-
versifying, Russia has specialized in oil, which 
now accounts for about 60 percent of exports 
(figures 2.1 and 2.2). Higher oil revenues cre-
ate more room for spending, but they also com-
plicate macroeconomic management and foster 
dependence on a volatile, uncertain source of 
income. This has not been a problem in the face 
of high oil prices, but it could become a major 
vulnerability if oil prices begin a rapid descent.
Issue 2: Russia will confront major  
public spending on pensions, health, and 
education in the medium to long term
Russia’s well-documented demographic trends 
are key drivers of major social spending. A de-
clining, aging population, higher demand for pen-
sion and health services, and a changing demand 
structure for education will mean that public 
spending on these areas is likely to increase sig-
nificantly. Main social expenditures are likely to 
increase by 3.5 percentage points of GDP—from 
14.1 percent of GDP in 2008–10 to about 17.3 
percent in 2016–20. This estimate is in line with 
recent comments by the finance minister. If, as 
assumed, long-term fiscal revenues remain stable 
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and total public spending remains at about 31 
percent of GDP, this would mean that long-
term spending in other categories would need to 
adjust to avoid growth in total public spending 
(table 2.1). 
Total revenues are anticipated to stabilize 
around 34 percent of GDP over the long term 
as oil revenues and prices moderate. Expendi-
tures, meanwhile, are likely to increase during 
2008–10, reflecting the three-year budget plan, 
but are then projected to remain broadly con-
stant at about 31.3 percent of GDP until 2020. 
This scenario would mean that the government 
maintained fiscal prudence and kept some sur-
pluses, if substantially less than in recent years. 
The long-term increases in social spending, 
combined with estimates for total expendi-
tures, will put significant downward pres-
sure on all other public spending categories. 
Spending on all other functions would have 
to decline from 17.2 percent of GDP in 2008 
to 13.5 percent in 2020. This adjust-
ment should be feasible, still allowing 
for real growth in other spending. In 
a baseline scenario with 5.8 percent 
average real GDP growth over 2008–
2020, other spending would grow at 3.7 percent 
a year in real terms.
Issue 3: Unless the government under-
takes fiscal measures to ensure sustain-
ability, Russia will once again become a 
net debtor in the long term.
Under a baseline fiscal scenar-
io—the scenario underlying to-
day’s macroeconomic framework 
and the 2008–10 budget—Russia 
saves and dis-saves at the same 
time.2 Resources are added to the 
Reserve Fund, but meanwhile the 
transfers from the National Welfare 
Fund are not enough to cover the 
nonoil primary (noninterest) fiscal 
deficit. So, gross debt increases as a 
share of GDP. Continuing passively 
on this path, Russia could consume 
its oil fund assets and its other for-
eign exchange assets by the end of 
the planning horizon in 2040, reaching zero net 
debt. After that, Russia could again fall into 
debt. With gross debt increasing, oil funds will 
begin to shrink—budget transfers will exceed 
oil revenues (figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
2 All scenarios assume that oil prices fall back to about USD 
60 per barrel but remain constant in real terms thereafter, 
as assumed by the government.
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If spending is higher—say, if social spending 
pushes the expenditure-to-GDP ratio up by 
4 percentage points, without offsetting cuts 
in other spending or revenue gains—net as-
sets would deteriorate much faster. In that 
case, Russia could become a debtor country af-
ter 2018, with net debt reaching 61 percent by 
2040. That shows the cost of not responding to 
spending pressures. 
Cutting taxes—say, reducing the VAT rate by 
4 percentage points—could raise the nonoil 
primary fiscal deficit by at least 1.5 percent 
of GDP against the base case. Russia would 
be able to finance this deficit with oil fund as-
sets for only the next 20 years. From 2025 the 
country would start accumulating net debt 
again, reaching 37 percent of GDP by 2040. 
That shows the cost of a hasty tax cut while 
revenues are booming.
But if Russia adopts a “permanent income” 
rule—keeping the nonoil primary fiscal defi-
cit below an estimated 4.7 percent of GDP—
sustainability would not face a threat. This 
deficit could be fully financed from the perma-
nent income from Russia’s oil assets. The net 
debt position would remain more or less un-
changed over the planning horizon. 
Four policy implications
The new government could prepare for the 1. 
possible decline in oil and gas prices and 
revenues by expanding its nonoil tax base 
and revenues. 
 This would require reviewing the nonoil 
tax bases, beginning with major tax instru-
ments such as the VAT, excise, and income 
taxes, to identify the losses from exemptions 
and other features that narrow the tax base. 
That review should yield recommendations 
to eliminate nonoil tax exemptions, along 
with the estimated revenue impact. This 
could be done during the ongoing prepara-
tions for the 2010–12 federal budget. Any 
cuts in key tax rates (e.g., VAT) should be 
delayed after the tax base is expanded in or-
der to avoid precipitous revenue losses.
The government could identify specific 2. 
functional categories of unproductive 
spending to target for cuts in the medi-
um term, to create room for rising priority 
expenditures—social spending and infra-
structure investment. This would require a 
systematic, annual review of public spend-
ing categories, in the context of the annual 
budget reviews, to identify the scope for 
cuts without affecting the desired service 
delivery. 
The government should keep fiscal sus-3. 
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tainability a high priority. The govern-
ment should return the nonoil primary fis-
cal deficit to a level consistent with fiscal 
sustainability—about 4.7 percent of GDP—
and keep it there. This would be broadly 
in line with the government’s own fiscal 
rule already in place for 2010 and later, but 
higher deficits are planned for 2008–09. But 
the actual nonoil primary fiscal balance now 
exceeds that required for the permanent in-
come rule to function. And the 2008–10 
budget plans further increases. 
One way to establish automatic fiscal 4. 
sustainability is to put in place a per-
manent income rule for fiscal policy. The 
rule says that Russia should spend only as 
much from oil assets as it earns on them in 
the long run. In practice, this would mean 
limiting the nonoil primary fiscal deficit to 
what can be financed from the permanent 
income from oil assets—an estimated 4.7 
percent of GDP—leaving the overall oil 
assets (in financial terms) intact for future 
generations. Today, the nonoil primary fis-
cal deficit is about 5 percent of GDP, so 
relatively small adjustments could return 
it to a permanently sustainable level. But 
unless the rule is implemented systemati-
cally, the nonoil primary fiscal deficit will 
likely increase and begin depleting oil as-
sets, using them for current consumption 
and leaving less—or nothing—to future 
generations.
 Russia could also ensure long-term fiscal 
sustainability with prudent discretionary 
fiscal policy, with adjustments through its 
annual and three-year budget reviews—
as it has done in the past nine years. But 
applying the permanent income rule would 
eliminate uncertainty and make fiscal poli-
cy less vulnerable to political pressures. It 
would also likely lower external borrowing 
costs, thanks to greater certainty about the 
stance and direction of fiscal policy, and 
dampen economic volatility, given the more 
stable fiscal position.
21 3TacklingHealth Reform 
The roots the Russian Federation’s health crisis are 
not entirely, or even primarily, in its health care 
system. High mortality and morbidity, particu-
larly among working-age men, reflect factors that 
transcend the health system—population aging, 
rapid urbanization, changing lifestyles, and risky 
behaviors. Spending more money on health care 
is necessary. But that will not be enough to sus-
tainably improve health outcomes. A multisectoral 
strategy is needed—one that addresses the poor 
health outcomes, the rising health expenditures, 
and the structural reforms needed to improve 
health care organization and service delivery. The 
task will be complex, requiring attention over the 
medium to long term. The new government should 
address it—forcefully—as soon as possible.
The health challenges—poor outcomes, 
insufficient spending
Grim statistics highlight the large health gap 
between the Russian Federation and other 
G8 and middle income countries. The Russian 
life expectancy at birth, 66 years, lags 16 years 
behind the Japanese and 14 years behind the 
European Union average. The leading causes 
of premature death, ill health, and disability 
among adults are noncommunicable diseases—
heart attacks, strokes, cancer—and injuries due 
to traffic accidents.
High mortality and morbidity among Rus-
sia’s working-age people threaten national 
security and economic and social develop-
ment. With Russia’s demographic crisis more 
serious than Western Europe’s, the labor sup-
ply is set to become a greater constraint on 
economic growth. Russia’s population has de-
clined by 6 million since 1992 to an estimated 
143 million. Most experts project a decline of 
about 30 percent by 2050 though immigration 
and better living conditions linked to strong 
long-term growth could partly counteract the 
1 This chapter is based on Marquez, P. et al. 2008. «Better 
Outcomes through Health Reforms in the Russian 
Federation: The Challenge in 2008 and Beyond.» Policy 
Note. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
projected decline. An annual inflow of roughly 
a million working-age migrants will be needed 
to fill the gap after 2007. 
Poor health among the working population 
has economic costs—low productivity, early 
retirement, and high medical spending. An 
accelerating dependence on migrant labor also 
raises national security questions, as does poor 
health in the military. And the Russian popula-
tion is aging, reflected in a shrinking youth co-
hort and an expanding proportion of the popu-
lation aged 60 and older. 
Russia’s declining health status came along-
side real decreases in public health spending. 
In the 1990s public spending for health care 
declined by a third in real terms, the result of 
big drops in the early years of the transition 
(figure 3.1). Spending rose above pre-transi-
tion levels in real terms only with additional 
resources from the National Priority Health 
Program in 2006–07. 
Public spending on health has fluctuated be-
tween 2.7 percent of GDP and 3.6 percent 
since 2001—low compared with European 
Union countries, which typically spend from 
6–8 percent of GDP on health. Russia’s total 
spending, both public and private, remains be-
low that of countries with similar per capita in-
comes, at 5.3 percent of GDP. The large share 
of private spending reflects out-of-pocket pay-
ments for informal charges and pharmaceuti-
cals. Those hinder access to quality health ser-
vices, particularly among the poor. 
Russia’s health spending is also poorly allo-
cated and inefficiently administered within 
regions. The result: an urgent need to improve 
the structure of health care spending and its ef-
ficiency. A recent IMF study shows that coun-
tries spending 30–40 percent less on health 
achieve health outcomes similar to Russia’s.2 
 
Local government spending on health ac-
counts for about 85 percent of Russia’s health 
spending, but the burden varies across re-
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gions. Local spending on health is usually 2–4 
percent of gross regional product, but it can 
be as much as 15 percent. The IMF study also 
shows large differences in efficiency across re-
gions. If the less efficient regions emulated the 
more efficient ones, about two-thirds of today’s 
inputs could produce the same health outcomes. 
A 2003 survey of more than 45,000 households 
found that poorer households, particularly in 
rural areas, pay more for informal medical care, 
and more as a percentage of consumption. This 
suggests that many families could be vulnerable 
and could perhaps fall into poverty—or deeper 
into poverty—as a result of rising costs to meet 
their health needs.
Three actions to address the health  
challenges
Russia’s new government should consider three 
broad lines of action to address the health care 
crisis.
First, to solve the health crisis, the govern-
ment must look beyond the health sector. Few 
would argue that the roots of the health crisis 
are entirely, or even primarily, in the health care 
system. High mortality and morbidity, particu-
larly among working-age men, reflect factors 
that transcend the health system—population 
aging, rapid urbanization, changing lifestyles, 
and risky behaviors. Overwhelming interna-
tional evidence suggests that a multisectoral 
strategy is the most cost-effective way to ad-
dress the challenge from noncommunicable 
diseases and injuries. In Russia, priority inter-
ventions should be: 
Discourage excessive alcohol consumption•	 . 
Interventions should target supply (regu-
lating production, distribution, prices, ac-
cess, and advertising) and demand (with in-
formation, education, and communications 
campaigns).
Discourage tobacco consumption•	 . Interven-
tions could include policies for smoke-free 
worksites and public places, taxation, and 
legislation for banning tobacco advertising, 
promotion, and sale to minors—in accor-
dance with the International Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, recently 
ratified by Russia.
Promote changes in diet and physical activ-•	
ity. This would mean incentives and di-
etary guidelines for healthier eating, along 
with school programs on the importance of 
healthy nutrition and physical activity. 
Improve road safety by enforcing laws to •	
prevent traffic accidents. Drunk driving re-
quires action. Today’s road infrastructure 
can be retrofitted with low-cost safety de-
sign features—medians and separation for 
pedestrians and cyclists. Also needed is 
systematic maintenance to minimize road 
hazards. 
Political leadership and more funding, both 
federal and regional, are required to intro-
duce and scale up these interventions. Broad 
public-private partnerships are also needed: 
employees’ poor health has a short-term impact 
on the financial bottom line of every company, 
and a longer term impact on the prospects for 
profitable growth. The government could en-
courage these partnerships with tax credits.
Second, Russia needs to spend more on health. 
The Russian health system lacks the funding to 
cover government promises of free basic medical 
services for the whole population. For a coun-
try that spends a relatively low share of GDP on 
health care, the guarantee package is extensive, 
however. With available resources insufficient 
to cover the package, access has been consis-
tently compromised over the last 15 years. The 
public system, likely to remain an important pil-
lar, could and should meet part of the needed 
increase. The Russian government, therefore, 
would need to gradually increase aggregate 
2 “Benchmarking the Efficiency of Public Expenditure in 
the Russian Federation,” David Hauner; IMF Working 
Paper 07/246: October 1, 2007.
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public funding for health from the 3.5 percent of 
GDP in 2006 to 4.5–6.0 percent within the next 
five to ten years—comparable to other middle-
income countries (table 3.1).3 Private spending 
is also expected to increase in the long term from 
1.8 percent of GDP to about 2.5–3 percent. 
Increasing public spending could help address 
long-standing problems. It could raise base sal-
aries for physicians and nurses. It could intro-
duce incentives for improving performance by 
differentiating pay by the volume and quality 
of health services. It could ensure free drugs for 
hospital care and fund targeted outpatient drug 
programs for children and the elderly. And it 
could rehabilitate health facilities, replace out-
dated equipment, and train personnel. 
How will Russia fund the higher spending? 
From reallocating expenditures from lower to 
higher priorities. Public spending will have to 
shift toward the long-term needs of health, edu-
cation, and pensions and away from less produc-
tive uses—untargeted subsidies and transfers, 
general administration spending, and unpro-
ductive public investments. Because the health 
financing system is based mostly on general 
budget revenue rather than on earmarked pay-
roll taxes, mechanisms should also be explored 
to raise more funding from regional budgets as 
contributions to mandatory health insurance 
for the nonworking population. Another area 
that merits attention is channeling more private 
health spending through voluntary health insur-
ance to complement mandatory insurance. 
Third, structural reforms to improve efficien-
cy must complement higher spending. Spend-
ing more is necessary. But it is not enough to 
improve Russia’s health outcomes sustainably. 
Structural reforms are needed to improve the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of health care’s orga-
nization and service delivery. Four areas should 
be targeted to gradually improve the allocation 
and use of health funds within regions: 
Revenue pooling should be centralized.•	  
Russia’s health financing system is frag-
mented—far more decentralized than in 
most middle- and high-income countries. 
It is also inefficient, with unnecessarily 
duplicated administrative procedures and 
high transaction costs. Funding comes from 
federal, regional, and municipality budgets, 
as well as from the mandatory health in-
surance scheme established in 1993. Bud-
get funding accounts for about 60 percent 
of public health spending, the mandatory 
health insurance scheme for the rest. Most 
public sector funds—more than 85 percent—
are raised and allocated regionally through 
general revenues and the 3.1 percent payroll 
tax. But budget equalization transfers from 
the federal government have never been 
earmarked for health, and regions have been 
mostly unwilling to contribute for non-
working groups or to pool necessary funds 
under the regional health insurance funds, 
as called for in the legislation. 
 Gradually integrating financial resourc-
es from federal and regional government 
transfers and from the mandatory health 
insurance scheme would enable establish-
ing single-payer funding for public health 
services. This would, in turn, allow more 
meaningful strategic planning for regional 
health systems, encourage integration and 
coordination, reduce barriers to intrasec-
toral activities, and provide greater flexibil-
ity to transfer funds between services. 
The guaranteed package of medical benefits •	
needs revision. Health care spending is ex-
pected to continue to climb, both in absolute 
terms and relative to GDP. But the balance 
between commitments and resources cannot 
be restored merely by increasing resources. 
The guaranteed package of medical benefits 
will have to be reexamined. This means more 
than just assessing what the state can afford. 
If the state guarantee is to be meaningful, the 
package must be transparent to providers 
and patients, specifying the types, volumes, 
procedures, and conditions of health care 
provision. It must also give citizens the tools 
to assert their rights if commitments are not 
met. A set of services and drugs should be es-
tablished for priority diseases, to be provided 
free based on government guarantees. The 
state guarantees should ideally be funded 
from a single source, preventing perverse in-
centives for unjustified shifting of costs from 
one source to another. 
The organization of health care services •	
must be rebalanced. Russia’s regions need 
significant capital investment to restruc-
3 These projections are based on the prevailing demographic 
trends and strong outlook for the Russian economy, 
expected to generate significant additional demand for 
health services.
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ture, renew, and equip their health provider 
infrastructure. Some additional infrastruc-
ture will be needed because of geographic 
dispersion and severe climatic conditions. 
But modernizing the existing network is 
a greater need. Judicious investments—in 
intermediate care centers, primary care 
facilities, emergency medical services, hu-
man resources, and management systems, 
including introducing electronic medical 
records—can substantially reduce the num-
ber of admissions and the length of stay in 
Russian hospitals. Meanwhile, the coverage 
of ambulatory services could be expanded. 
 Many facilities have unused capacity, so re-
sizing costly hospital infrastructure could 
improve the quality and usefulness of to-
day’s capital stock and create an environ-
ment that promotes applying new tech-
nologies to current and emerging health 
needs. Attention is also needed on how to 
strengthen the organization and financing 
of long-term care services, including nurs-
ing home and home care, for people depen-
dant on ongoing help due to aging, chronic 
diseases, or physical or mental disabilities. 
Provider payment systems need incentives •	
to enhance quality and efficiency. Build-
ing on the new contracts introduced in 
Voronezh and the Chuvash Republic—with 
the support of the World Bank–funded 
Health Reform Implementation Project—
the government should introduce incen-
tives to expand the scope of services and to 
improve the quality of primary health care. 
 Per capita payments should be combined with 
performance pay, linked to achieving qual-
ity standards or providing new services. Bo-
nus payments could be provided for reaching 
quality and efficiency targets—say, expanded 
coverage for immunization, cervical screen-
ing, annual health advice, smoking cessation, 
alcohol reduction, elderly checks, and devel-
opmental checks for infants and children. 
 Alternatively, fee-for-service payments 
could be used to strengthen services and 
to expand their scope, by introducing new 
services for general health promotion, dedi-
cated chronic disease management pro-
grams (for diabetes mellitus, ischemic heart 
disease, heart failure, hypertension, asthma, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, epi-
lepsy, and stroke), and minor surgery. 
 The payment systems for primary health care 
should be modified so that 20–25 percent of 
the payment for primary health units is re-
lated to outputs and outcomes—not inputs. 
Quality targets for key noncommunicable 
diseases—cardiovascular diseases, cancer, 
diabetes, chronic lung diseases—should be 
clearly defined. These constitute Russia’s 
greatest disease burden. 
 Hospitals in Russia are paid mostly per 
treated case, but some items of expenditure 
(mostly fixed) are not included in manda-
tory health insurance tariffs, instead cov-
ered directly from budgets controlled by 
governments at various levels This combi-
nation is inefficient. Line item budgeting 
pays for inputs, with little incentive for 
providers to improve efficiency. Funds pro-
vided through line item budgeting should 
be incorporated into the existing tariffs, 
which in turn should be modified to incor-
porate quality and efficiency standards—for 
example, stipulating average lengths of stay 
in line with what can be achieved through 
more cost-effective medical interventions. 
Because case-based payment methods are 
inflationary, encouraging providers to in-
crease activity to generate maximum rev-
enues, they should be combined with cost 
and volume contracts that specify a level of 
activity for a given year and specialty.
Summing up: Addressing Russia’s health chal-
lenges will require broad policy and institu-
tional reforms—at the federal, regional, and 
municipal levels––and covering many sectors, 
not just the health system. Implementing the 
proposed reforms as a package will bring the co-
herence needed for this complex effort. Reform 
is a medium to long term undertaking, but the 
new government should accelerate progress—
forcefully—as soon as possible. 
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